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During much of the previous era of globalization, from the 1860s until the First 
World War, U.S. tariffs were surprisingly high.  Present-day economic historians 
have suggested that U.S. protection was the result of a “backlash” against 
globalization that was the beginning of its decline.  They have also argued that the 
backlash holds a lesson for the present: specifically, that we must attend to the 
distributive inequities that globalization engenders, or else globalization will 
again plant the seeds of its own destruction.  I show that U.S. tariffs were not the 
product of backlash. A history of economic ideas in the nineteenth century United 
States, centered on two tariff commissions in 1866-1870 and 1882, reveals that 
the ideas debated in intellectual and policy circles alike bore no trace of 
globalization backlash. The important feature of U.S. intellectual and tariff policy 
history is not globalization backlash, but rather the absence from most historical 
accounts of certain thinkers and ideas that were crucial to the debate.   
Accordingly, the lesson that history holds for the present is not that we must 
attend to globalization’s inequities.  (That lesson is likely to stand or fall apart 
from history.)  Instead it is that we need to attend to the idea of backlash, which 
has a foothold in history that is deeper than the evidence.  The lesson implies that 
to understand the present and future of globalization, what are required are 
histories of ideas. 
 
∗ I am grateful to Craufurd Goodwin, Roy Weintraub, and other participants at the Duke History of Political 
Economy workshop for helping me to fill gaps in an earlier version of this essay.  I also owe thanks, with the usual 
disclaimers, to Roger Bolton, Henry Bruton, Tess Chakkalakal, Anthony Howe, Douglas Irwin, and Shauna 
Saunders.  




This essay is about a puzzle—the simplest statement of which is a familiar game. What’s wrong 
with this picture? 
Figure 1. “THE SIAMESE TWINS OF TO-DAY.  One of Them Thrives on it – but 





  The puzzle is historical, but it is also topical.  Much scholarship has been devoted, 
through the 1990s to the present, to understanding the phenomenon of globalization by studying 
its past: Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson (1999) and Harold James (2001) are among the 
more notable authors.  A measure of the scholarship’s success is the depth to which this basic 
idea has permeated conventional wisdom outside of the scholarly literature.  The idea is that 
there was an earlier era of globalization lasting from the early nineteenth century until the First 
World War, and in important ways it was like globalization today.  I will refer to the idea as the  
  6
                                                
“U thesis”: the fragmentation of world markets for capital, labor, and commodities after the First 
World War, lasting roughly until the end of the Second World War, is envisioned as the nadir of 
a U-shaped curve on a plot of some measure of globalization over time.
1 
  To some the U thesis is appealing because it bears insights into the past.  To most it is 
appealing because it carries a lesson for the present.  To reveal the lesson, though, one has to 
determine what caused the nadir.     
  Enter the corollary “backlash thesis.”  An idea that is almost as conventional as the U 
thesis holds that the previous globalization sowed the seeds of its own destruction.  Its 
consequences for income distribution impelled populations and their political representatives to 
unlink their capital, labor, and commodities markets from the world economy.  “A political 
backlash developed in response to the actual or perceived distributional effects of globalization,” 
write O’Rourke and Williamson (1999, pp. 286-287).  “The backlash led to the reimposition of 
tariffs and the adoption of immigration restrictions, even before the Great War.”  Amidst the 
swell of protests about the inequities of globalization from Seattle to Quebec City to Genoa, and 
wherever else multilateral meetings to discuss market integration convene, the lesson of the 
backlash thesis is heard as this: attend to the inequities that globalization breeds, or people will 
not accept globalization. 
  To a scholar with the U and the backlash already in mind, policies formed in the second 
half of the nineteenth century or the early twentieth century that insulated, or were intended to 
insulate, national markets from the world appear prima facie to be instances of backlash.  But 
what if they were not?  What would become of the lesson? 
  In the United States at the close of the Civil War, a population that had endured a 
dizzying array of taxes and import tariffs, ostensibly for war revenue, expected relief.  From 
1847 to 1860, as shown in Table 1, the ratio of import duties to all imports averaged 21.7 
percent, and the ratio of duties to dutiable imports averaged 25 percent.  At the end of 1865, after 
a succession of wartime increases, the statistics had nearly doubled to 38.5 percent and 47.6 
percent, respectively.   
 
1 In addition to the books by O’Rourke and Williamson and James, recent works developing the U-thesis include 
essays by Maurice Obstfeld and Alan Taylor (2002) and Barry Eichengreen and Harold James (2002) for the case of 
capital markets, by Barry Chiswick and Timothy Hatton (2002) for labor markets, and by Ronald Findlay and Kevin 
O’Rourke (2002) and Antoni Estevadeordal, Brian Frantz and Alan Taylor (2002) for commodities markets.   
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  Over the following half century tariffs were reduced—but they still remained, at 28.8 
percent and 44.9 percent, on average, surprisingly high.  Table 1 and Figure 2 together provide 
the perspective of a century and a half.  Tariffs throughout the period were high compared to the 
Walker Tariff in place before the Civil War; high compared even to tariffs during the 
interruption of globalization between the World Wars; and high, it hardly needs to be added, 
compared to post-World War II tariffs in the present era of globalization.  They were also high 
compared to the expectations of tariff reformers at the end of the Civil War.  Only in 1913—at 
the precipice, ironically, of the end of globalization—were the reformers’ expectations finally 
met, albeit posthumously. 
 
Table 1. Average Tariff, 1821-1971, by Era 









1821-1846  33.1%  41.2%  Tariff of Abominations (May 1828) 
1847-1860  21.7%  25.0%  Walker tariff (October 1846) 
1861-1865  27.8%  34.4%  Civil War, Morrill tariff (April 1861)
1866-1913  28.8%  44.9%  Globalization post-Civil War 
1914-1946  13.1%  36.3%  End of globalization 
1947-1970  6.5%  12.2%  Globalization post-WWII 













  The puzzle of the post-Civil War period is not how globalization proceeded in an era of 
American protection.  That question has been answered convincingly by others.  O’Rourke and 
Williamson (1999, Chapter 3) have reiterated the changes David A. Wells (1889) documented as 
they were happening: although American protection was high, innovations in shipping, railroads, 
and refrigeration caused transportation costs worldwide to fall rapidly, integrating protected 
markets like the United States along with the unprotected.     
  The puzzle lies instead in fitting the protection that prevailed into a story of the 
vicissitudes of globalization that includes a lesson for the present.  Were high tariffs the product 
of backlash?  Was international trade perceived to benefit the moneyed and harm the 
dispossessed?  Was free trade perceived to be likely to exacerbate the maldistribution, and 
sustained protection to mitigate it?   
  In the nineteenth century, in other words, was Figure 1, in which we see the plutocrat 
eviscerating the common man through his hip pocket by means of free trade, as faithful a 
representation of widespread concerns about globalization as it is in the twenty-first?   
  This essay is intended as part of a solution.  It can be only a part: tariff protection directly 
affects commodities markets, an important component of the global economy but not the only 
one.  Likewise, the motives for protection may have differed outside of the United States, an 
important participant in the global economy but not the only one.  Yet the lesson that is drawn  
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for the present depends in no small part on the history of tariff protection and the case of the 
United States.  One premise is that late nineteenth century protection in the U.S. was the 
outcome of backlash.  If the premise turns out to be dubious, then so may be the lesson.   
  While the essay homes in thematically to tariff policy, and geographically to one country, 
it does so temporally to two focal points: the tariff commissions enacted by Congress for the 
years 1866-1870 and 1882.
2  If backlash is to be understood as it is implied—as not only a 
material condition or a policy, but an idea about conditions that incites a change, or perhaps 
maintenance, of policy—then it should be sought in a history of ideas.  The tariff commissions 
are good sites for centering the search.  In the testimonies that the commissions collected, the 
reports they submitted, and the debates they provoked in Congress and other forums, economists, 
citizens, businessmen and policymakers articulated the ideas that influenced economic policy. 
  Concerning the ideas that sustained protection for half a century, what emerges from the 
history is that they cannot, without contortions, be said to have manifested backlash.  Concerning 
the ideas that were bested, what emerges is their salience nonetheless in policy debates—and in 
light of their salience, the surprising extent to which history has forgotten, if not the ideas 
themselves, their chief exponents and the interests they represented. 
  There may be a lesson in all this for present-day globalization, but it is not the 
conventional one.  To draw it I will first sketch the ideas of the leading American intellectual 
advocates of protection and free trade at the waning of the Civil War, and then review the 
debates revolving around the two tariff commissions where their ideas clashed most visibly.  
 
Economic Ideas and the Tariff in the 1860s 
          
Douglas Irwin’s intellectual history of free trade, Against the Tide (1996), covers superbly the 
contributions to past tariff debates of the political economists to whom contemporary economics 
most often traces its lineage.  Those of the nineteenth century are principally British, so Irwin 
does not dwell on the protagonists of this essay.  He mentions a few times in passing the 
protectionist Henry C. Carey.  He does not mention the free traders Arthur Latham Perry and 
David A. Wells.  In the few histories that consider all three—only Joseph Dorfman’s opus  
  10
                                                                                                                                                            
(Dorfman, 1946; 1949) comes to mind—they are not grouped together and Perry and Wells are 
given little weight.  The favorite general references of historians of economics, those by Joseph 
Schumpeter (1950) and Henry Spiegel (1991), allocate a combined five pages to Carey, two 
paragraphs and a note to Wells (both Schumpeter’s), and not a word to Perry.  Yet Carey, Perry 
and Wells were among the most prominent authors and advocates whose ideas collided in the 
outstanding sustained policy debate of late nineteenth century America.  They require an 
introduction. 
               
Henry Charles Carey 
 
Surveying political economy in the United States from across the Atlantic in 1880, Thomas E. 
Cliffe Leslie referred to the disadvantages faced by American manufacturers relative to the 
English, and to the ideas that had taken root in America to overcome them.  “Instead of taking 
sulk at political economy and turning his back on it, as the English protectionist did,” he wrote, 
“the shrewder American sought a political economy on his own side, advocating a development 
of all the national resources; and authors and lecturers were soon forthcoming to supply the 
demand for economic science of this sort” (Cliffe Leslie, 1880, p. 500).  Henry C. Carey was the 
shrewdest.   
  Carey, born in 1793 to a father who was also an influential protectionist thinker, had long 
been a leading participant in the nation’s tariff debate when it re-opened at the end of the Civil 
War.  In 1847, piqued by the Walker tariff reduction, he wrote in three months his book titled 
The Past, the Present and the Future (Carey [1847] 1872; Dorfman 1946, p. 799).  It was a 
justification of protection built upon a self-contained system of historical and economic laws; it 
benefited from a young nation’s experience of having watched the laws unfold in the compressed 
time of generations instead of centuries or millennia.  Carey’s system implied a harmony of 
interests between labor and capital that would exist but for “the interference of the laws of man 
with those of the Deity” ([1847] 1872, p. 311).  In a later book, The Unity of Law; as Exhibited 
in the Relations of Physical, Social, Mental, and Moral Science (1872), he claimed priority for 
the ideas articulated by Frederic Bastiat, whose opposition to protection was founded similarly 
 
2 Since writing this essay I have found an excellent treatment of the same theme by Anthony Howe (2000), who has 
a wider geographical scope, including Great Britain as well as the United States, but who does not delve into the two 
tariff commissions.  
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on a system of economic harmonies.  To Carey, though, the protective tariff was not necessarily 
an interference with the laws of the Deity.  Sometimes it was necessary to preserve their natural 
harmony. 
  The crux of his argument was to show that what was “natural,” particularly in the 
settlement of land and the concentration of population, was not what political economists had 
theretofore believed.  Carey took issue with Ricardo in particular.   Ricardo had proposed that the 
most fertile lands were settled first, and that as the population grew, less fertile lands came under 
cultivation while more rent accrued to the better lands’ owners.  “Mr. Ricardo’s system is one of 
discords,” Carey argued: if people married and multiplied, rents were raised and wages 
depressed; if the rights of property were respected, undeserved rewards accrued to the few and 
misery to the many.  “His book,” he pronounced, “is the true manual of the demagogue, who 
seeks power by means of agrarianism, war, and plunder” ([1847] 1872, pp. 74-75).  But 
Ricardo’s system was not only worrisome, it was wrong: “Mr. Ricardo’s proposition is 
diametrically opposed to all the facts presented by the history of the United States: of England: 
and of the World” (p. 56).  The proof was in the way that land settlement and population growth 
had proceeded naturally in the past, and the way it still proceeded.  Ricardo, he claimed, was too 
far removed from the process to discern it (p. 24). 
  To read Carey one must think of pyramids.  The pyramid is the abstract form of a 
mountain, Carey’s point of reference for showing how settlement proceeds through time.  It is 
also the abstract form of the proper relationships among families, communities, and nations.   
  Human settlement in any region, Carey explained, does not begin on the most fertile 
lands, as Ricardo had assumed, but on the lands that are easiest to clear with a minimum of 
technology.  The first settlers of Massachusetts settled at rocky Plymouth and eked out a living 
as best they could; in New York settlers first chose land high above the Hudson River instead of 
the fertile land at its bank ([1847] 1872, pp. 25-26).  The more fertile is the land, the denser are 
its forests and swamps and the harder they are to clear.  A community of early settlers who are 
sparsely concentrated and produce little surplus food are hardly able to tame wild forests and 
swamps with their scant time and primitive techniques.  Nor do they have the luxury to study 
new techniques.  Therefore they choose sites that are midway or near the top of a mountain or 
hill, not in the river valley below.     
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  Few people can concentrate on unfertile land, but as those few make halting 
improvements in their techniques of clearance and cultivation, they can at once move down the 
mountain to the superior land and support a greater population.  With a greater population, a 
smaller proportion of it is needed for cultivation—so many more minds can be employed in 
devising better techniques ([1847] 1872, p. 25).  In addition, techniques improve not only 
because more minds are devoted to their improvement, but also because the minds are made 
more productive by their collaboration.  Better techniques of clearance and cultivation allow the 
community to move on to still better soil, and even to improve the inferior soils—which permits 
more population growth, and so on.  Rent increases with population growth, but not as Ricardo 
imagined.  More rent is paid for the newly cultivated land, not the old: it is the reward to its 
cultivators of its greater fertility, made possible by the community’s accumulated improvements 
in techniques (p. 62). 
  Further improvements make the community still more concentrated and wealthy.  Its 
citizens move back up the side of the mountain from which they descended, cultivating with 
improved techniques the land they once abandoned and diversifying their occupations and trade 
with one another.  As they grow wealthier they begin to profit from intercourse with other 
communities—primarily those nearby, and gradually and to a lesser extent those more distant.  
Each mountainside community now resembles spatially a pyramid, at the base of which the most 
land is cultivated most intensively.  As each becomes more concentrated in terms of population, 
intensiveness of cultivation, and diversification of activities, so too does the group of them.  
 
If, now, we take a bird’s-eye view of these various communities, we shall 
see in each an infinite number of little pyramids, with heights proportioned 
to their breadth and depth.  With the extension of the breadth of cultivation 
we have seen it rising in its height until it has advanced far up the steep 
hill-side; and on all sides we see it rising higher as it sinks deeper into the 
fertile soils of the valley below. ... With the establishment of intercourse 
among these little communities, the tendency to union, so well begun in 
each, is seen to spread.  Each grows in wealth and population, and 
intercourse becomes more frequent; and next we find them all combining  
for the making of roads, or canals, the founding of colleges, and other 
works calculated to promote the common good.  The union becomes more 
complete: ... General laws now embrace the whole of the various societies 
constituting this pyramid, which now surmounts the whole (Carey [1847] 
1872, p. 286). 
 
  In the last sentence the pyramid of the mountainside community transfigures into a 
pyramid of social organization.  The rationale of protection lies in both.  At the base of the social 
pyramid are each community’s many family units.  Each family, organizationally, is a pyramid 
in itself—and each, crucially, is inward-looking.  Husbands, wives and children are more 
concerned with the welfare of their family than they are with that of the larger organizational 
pyramids comprising it ([1847] 1872, pp. 287-289).  Nevertheless, to build local roads, schools, 
libraries and churches, families will combine to form a community, which is similarly concerned 
principally with the welfare of its constituents.  Communities, too, in order to build highways 
and canals, will combine to form a state; states will form nations; and, presumably, nations will 
form alliances.  But the natural tendency of each organizational unit is to look primarily inward 
(downward from its apex, as it were).  Each derives advantages from, but does not concern itself 
disproportionately with, the larger union of which it is a member. 
  To Carey, any inversion of the relations within and among the pyramids would be an 
interference in the natural order and would erode the wealth of the whole.  Exactly such an 
inversion, he argued, would result in the United States without tariff protection.  Europe’s 
demand for produce, combined with the abundance of land in the United States, already 
encouraged people to disperse too widely.  Too many Americans cultivated poor soils and traded 
their produce with distant buyers when they should have concentrated on rich soils, diversified 
their activities within smaller geographic areas, and traded with their neighbors.  To illustrate he 
pointed to the rich meadows of Pennsylvania, between the manufacturing centers of Pittsburgh 
and Philadelphia, which remained covered wastefully with timber while pioneers migrated west 
to cultivate dry prairies ([1847] 1872, p. 298).  It might appear that the pioneers moved en masse 
because manufactures were acquired cheapest by interregional and international specialization 
and trade.  But the appearance is deceptive, Carey held, and the relation unnatural.  “In a natural 
state of things, the people of the United States can manufacture more cheaply than any nation of 
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the world. ... All that is wanted is that the shoemaker with his lapstone shall be permitted to take 
his place by the side of the hides and the food, as he would long since have done but for the 
existence of a disturbing force of prodigious power” (p. 470).  If people are concentrated and 
their activities diversified they will have more of both manufactures and produce, shoes and 
food.  Their concentration ensures that they will have the techniques and the impetus to cultivate 
the most fertile soil; its fertility will feed a diverse manufacturing community that develops the 
techniques.  If unnatural commercial opportunities encourage them to settle differently, they will 
have less of both. 
  Hence the need for tariff protection.  “Concentration, even to its present extent, cannot be 
maintained without protection ... we must arrest the progress of depopulation and promote 
concentration upon rich soils, and that can be done only by increased protection” ([1847] 1872, 
p. 469).   And to those who would complain about the negation of “free trade,” Carey responded 
that far from negating it, protection enabled it.  By permitting the farmer to stand side by side 
with the shoemaker [italics Carey’s], protection sustains the natural geographic, commercial and 
social order, without which “every attempt at the establishment of freedom of trade must be a 
failure” (p. 470).    
 
Arthur Latham Perry          
        
Carey’s claim to stand for “freedom of trade” was sincere, but it was most likely heard as a 
rhetorical flourish that many appreciated but few imitated.  To participants in the American tariff 
controversies of the 1860s and the rest of the century, free trade was associated with the 
arguments, and the particular personage, of Arthur Latham Perry. 
  The last statement may appear hyperbolic considering Perry’s virtual absence from the 
history of economics.  His nonappearance in Schumpeter’s and Spiegel’s texts is mirrored in the 
literature canvassed by the Social Sciences Citation Index.  Searching the Index for all articles 
citing Perry in the quarter century from 1978 to 2002, one finds five.  To put the figure in 
perspective, in the same period there were 53 articles citing Carey, 365 citing William Stanley 
Jevons, and 921 citing J. S. Mill for his Principles alone.
3  Apart from the seven pages devoted to 
                                                 
3 For 2002 the statistics apply only through September 15.   
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Perry in the third volume of Dorfman’s work, I know of only one thorough evaluation of his 
thought produced since his death in 1905.
4   
  The neglect is curious.  Perry was the most widely read American economist of his time.  
Dorfman (1949, p. 81) referred to a survey by Publisher’s Weekly in 1876 of the “most salable 
works on political economy” that listed Perry’s main text in third place, behind the those of Mill 
and Adam Smith, and well ahead of the seven others on the list including Jevons’s.  Michael 
O’Connor, in his exhaustive survey of the origins of American academic economics (1944, p. 
265), named Perry’s text “the outstanding book of its period.”  Intellectual historian Henry Steele 
Commager (1950, p. 231) concurred.  Cliffe Leslie (1880, pp. 500-501), in the same essay in 
which he cited Henry Carey as the most prominent American protectionist, cited Perry as one of 
the two most prominent free traders (and, evidently, the one most worthy of mention).  Although 
such testimonials were few in the time of Dorfman, O’Connor, and Commager, and nearly 
absent today, they were numerous in the time of Cliffe Leslie and Perry. 
  Judith Goldstein (1993)—who, in a telling slip, misspells Perry’s full name (p. 85)—
implies that he has disappeared because, although he reigned in the academy, he “had little effect 
on a political sector that was seemingly in search of new ideas to help it cope with a changing 
America.”  If to be said to have had effect he must have succeeded in reducing substantially the 
tariff, her implication is right.  By any other standard it is wrong.  The tariff was not much 
reduced in Perry’s lifetime, but his ideas and advocacy were central to the tempestuous debate— 
academic and  political—about reducing it.  One cannot follow the debate’s flotsam without 
bumping repeatedly into his name.    
  The significance of Perry’s near absence from the historical record will be taken up at the 
conclusion.  Now I will introduce the economist and his ideas.
5         
  Born in 1830 and graduated from Williams College in 1852, Perry was the intellectual 
progeny of Williams’s illustrious president Mark Hopkins.  “The essentials of the Hopkins 
position were three,” wrote historian Ralph Henry Gabriel (1940, p. 149): “individualism, the 
sanctity of private property, and the duty of stewardship.”  All three were colored by the 
                                                 
4 The essay to which I refer is a wonderful, yet unpublished, contrast of Perry’s and Henry George’s ideas on land 
rent by Roger Bolton (1993).  It is the most useful resource that exists to date for details and references about Perry. 
5 I do not make much of the distinction in Perry’s case between “economist” and “political economist,” nor 
“economics” and “political economy,” because Perry did not.  He preferred generally “Political Economy” to 
“economics,” although he used both interchangeably (e.g., Perry, 1887, pp. 89-116).  On the other hand he preferred 
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evangelical Protestantism that suffused Hopkins’s teachings.  As additional influences Perry had 
the faculty and the texts from which they drew.  Francis Wayland’s Elements of Political 
Economy and Elements of Moral Science, adopted widely in college curricula before the Civil 
War, were adopted as well at Williams.  In his junior and senior years Perry studied both 
(Williams College, 1851).
6   
  Moral philosophy, wrote Wayland in the Elements of Moral Science (Wayland, 1837, pp. 
23-24), was the science of moral law; it held the same scientific status as Newton’s laws of 
motion, the axioms of mathematics, and the laws of chemistry.  The reverse was true as well: all 
scientific laws, moral and physical, were timeless and related through God, who enacted them.  
After Hopkins summoned Perry back to Williams to join the faculty in 1854, his first notable 
work, a series of “Papers on Political Economy” (1864) that he wrote for the influential 
Springfield [Massachusetts] Daily Republican, bore the impression of his training.  “If proofs of 
God’s goodness be anywhere discernible, they are discernible, and are found, in the fundamental 
laws of Society,” he wrote.   “They cover the phenomena of exchange, just as they cover the 
phenomena of morals; and no intelligent observer can watch their working, when left intact and 
free, without being stimulated and gladdened by the beneficent results to which they lead” 
(Perry, 1864, 30 March). 
  The “Papers” met the enthusiastic response of Amasa Walker, who encouraged Perry to 
expand them; they were the seeds of his Elements of Political Economy (later simply Political 
Economy).  The Elements ran through twenty-two editions from 1866 to 1895 and secured for 
Perry an international stature (Dorfman, 1946, p. 983; 1949, p. 81).  His theoretical contribution 
(notwithstanding the mild deprecations of Charles Dunbar of Harvard (1876, p. 136) and Cliffe 
Leslie (1880, pp. 500-501), who did not accept it as such) was towards refounding political 
economy as a “science of exchanges” instead of a “science of wealth.”  What he meant is evident 
in the Elements’ lengthy opening chapter, Perry’s “History of the Science.”
7    
                                                                                                                                                             
more strongly “economist” to “political economist.”  His use of “economist” dates from his first notable writings in 
the field (1864, 6 April).    
6 Wayland was exemplar of the “clerical school” of political economy, influential particularly in the antebellum 
Northeastern and Western United States, according to O’Connor (1944, pp. 156-217).  Another member of the 
school, the Reverend Joseph Alden (1807-1885), was the Williams professor who lectured to Perry using Wayland’s 
texts.  Perry replaced Alden on the faculty in 1854 (ibid., p. 266). 
7 The chapter was twenty-two pages long in the first edition (1866), but grew to over eighty in later editions.  
Because the later versions of the historical chapter offer a better view of how Perry understood his own ideas in 
historical context, while the other relevant parts of the text changed relatively little, I will quote from the nineteenth 
edition (1887). 
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  François Quesnay and his followers enter Perry’s history as members of the Agricultural 
School, which maintained that only labor applied to land to produce agriculture was truly 
productive of richesse, or wealth.  Adam Smith enters as founder of the Commodities School, 
which supposed that any labor that produced commodities was productive of wealth, but not 
other labor.  To Perry, both schools erred.  They privileged the products of land and labor as the 
stuff of wealth, and wealth as the domain of political economy.  The result was inconsistency.  
Smith, for instance, had written that the production of wealth required capital, both fixed and 
circulating, and that bank notes and bills of exchange were circulating capital.  Yet neither of 
them was the product of land or labor (Perry, 1887, p. 66).  So were they “wealth” or were they 
not?  If the definitions that Smith had laid out were respected, they were not wealth.  By 
implying that they were, Smith had ignored his own definitions—as he should have done.  To 
have done otherwise would have been to suggest that bank notes and bills of exchange should be 
understood differently from commodities; it would have been to suggest that they were subject to 
different laws of political economy, or that they were outside the domain of political economy 
altogether.  Perry would not countenance either suggestion.   
  Although Smith was right to ignore his definitions when he found them too narrow, Perry 
argued, his inconsistency bred mischief.  Once they were ignored there was no limit to what 
could be considered “wealth” or permitted in the domain of political economy.  Bonamy Price of 
Oxford claimed “that the qualities of a people, their moral, intellectual and physical natures, are 
parts of their wealth” (Perry, 1887, pp. 69-70); Jean-Baptiste Say proposed that political 
economy was “the science of society” (ibid., p. 112).  The definition of wealth and the domain of 
political economy, which began as “quite too narrow,” had become at once “quite too wide” (p. 
66): no two people could agree what they were.  Economists’ inability to settle on the meaning of 
their terms and the limits of their field was “the chief reason of the slow progress of the science” 
(p. 99).  Inquiry had degenerated into cacophony.  At bottom the problem was the word 
“wealth,” which was impossible to define with precision; it was “the bog whence most of the 
mists have arisen that have beclouded the whole subject” (p. 99).  To pull political economy 
from the bog, the word had to be discarded.  Without it the science could be delimited 
appropriately and its terms defined consistently. 
  To that end, the history continued, the All Sales School taught that political economy was 
“the science of value, and of nothing else”—as Perry himself written in his “Papers” (1864, 
  17 
March 2).  Perry was the school’s chief exponent in the United States; Henry Dunning Macleod 
filled the role in Great Britain.  The school’s tenets were these.  Value is not inherent to the 
products of land or labor, nor do its laws apply differently to such products than to any other 
valued thing.  The laws are grounded in men’s desires, in their capability of making efforts to 
meet their desires, and in their satisfaction when the desires were met.  Obstacles must be 
surmounted in meeting desires, but the efforts required to surmount them are exchangeable: 
anyone can choose the obstacles that he prefers to surmount and exchange his efforts with others.  
Efforts may be embodied in commodities, or they may be embodied in services, or they may be 
deferred and promised to another who holds the promise as a claim.  In any case, when people 
exchange commodities for commodities, commodities for services, services for services, or 
services for claims, in essence they are trading efforts for efforts.  Because efforts and services 
are synonymous, we may as well do away with the distinctions between commodities and 
services and claims: let them all be called services.  When, and only when, one service is 
exchanged for another, the value of both is determined.  There is no inherent value (Perry, 1887, 
pp. 51-54, 85, 117-164).    
  In effect Perry proposed a subjective theory of value from the mid-1860s, a time when 
the seeds of such theories were in the wind.  Those of which he caught hold were the writings of 
Etienne Bonnot de Condillac and more importantly Frederic Bastiat.  The theory’s distinction 
was its narrowing the scope of political economy to what Richard Whately, Archbishop of 
Dublin, had termed “catallactics,” the science of exchange (Perry, 1887, p. 71).  Narrowing the 
science’s scope in one sense made it universal in another.  The laws of political economy applied 
unconditionally wherever, whenever, and for whatever things, tangible or intangible, there was 
an exchange.   
  International exchange was no exception.  Nor was it even a particularly special case, 
although it was the case that concerned Perry especially.  Of protection versus free trade, which 
one he would favor was obvious.  Returning to the obstacles that must be surmounted to fulfill 
desires, we find that when a man concentrates his efforts in surmounting obstacles of a single 
kind the efforts are more effective.  The same is true for all men; so the more that each 
concentrates his efforts and exchanges the fruits with others, the more effective are the efforts of 
all.  More products and services are brought into existence, and more desires fulfilled.    
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Therefore, since Exchange indefinitely multiplies, in number and 
variety, the services which men may render to each other; since, by 
means of it, men’s satisfactions bear a larger and larger proportion to 
their efforts; and, since the only possible motive to an exchange is the 
mutual benefit of the parties, no reason can be given, no good reason 
ever has been given, why exchanges should not be the freest possible.  If 
it is universally conceded that domestic exchanges should be free, why 
not international exchanges?  Precisely the same principle holds.  The 
benefit of an exchange does not depend upon the accident that the 
parties to it are citizens, or subjects of the same country.  It is still 
rendering service for service (Perry, 1864, 16 March). 
 
  Such was Perry’s reasoning.  Equally pertinent was his depth of conviction, force of 
advocacy and style of expression.  To Perry free trade was not just reasonable doctrine; it was a 
cause to fight for.  “Commercial Liberty is still the underdog in the fight,” he would write to a 
prominent friend and former student late in his career, “and all my yearnings go forth to help my 
country from a degrading and impoverishing vassalage.  I am conscious of strong powers to help 
in this direction, derived from life-long studies and convictions deeper than life” (Cleveland 
Papers, letter by A. L. Perry to F. L. Stetson, 27 October 1885).  His powers lay in his ability to 
argue by combination of historical anecdote, contemporary statistics, apt example and logical 
thoroughness, culminating in a punch-line as rustic or eloquent as the audience required.   
Lecturing to Nebraska farmers on protection, he entreated them to “seize this lying fraud by the 
throat, and shake the life out of it, as a dog shakes the breath out of a woodchuck!” (1874, p. 18).  
To his textbook readers he summed up, “It is too late in the history of the world and of 
Christianity, too contrary to common sense and good neighborhood among nations, and too 
hostile to the real interests and power of any nation, to try to maintain anywhere heathenish and 
loss-begetting restrictions on trade” (1887, p. 580). 
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David Ames Wells  
 
David A. Wells (1828-1898) enters Joseph Dorfman’s account (1946, p. 975) as a “disciple” of 
Henry Carey.  He enters this one as exactly the opposite.  Although Carey influenced his early 
thoughts about protection, Wells converted eventually to Perry’s way of thinking so thoroughly 
that he became one of the four to whom Perry dedicated his Elements. 
  Like Perry, Wells was a pupil of Mark Hopkins, but he graduated five years earlier and 
without a paramount interest in political economy.  Wells left Williams with a proclivity towards 
science in general and wrote texts on physics (1857), chemistry (1858), and geology (1861).  
When he turned to political economy during the Civil War he did so with a keener mind for 
statistics than any other writer on the subject. 
  On March 3, 1865, Congress authorized a commission to study the country’s revenue 
needs and to recommend revisions of its labyrinthine war taxes.  Wells seemed a good choice for 
the task.  He had a reputation as a man of patriotism and probity, schooled in science, competent 
in political economy, and practical to the core—with a penchant for details, not dogma.  At least 
as important was his avowed predilection for protection (Wells, 1882, p. 20).  The congressmen 
and their constituents who had lobbied for more protection on the eve of the Civil War did not 
want to see the fruit of their efforts vanish at its end.  On March 24 Treasury Secretary Hugh 
McCulloch invited Wells to chair a commission of three charged “to inquire and report … upon 
the subject of raising by taxation such revenue as may be necessary in order to supply the wants 
of the Government etc; etc; etc.” (Wells, Papers, 24 March 1865).  The other members of the 
commission were S. S. Hayes and Stephen Colwell—the latter of whom exceeded Wells in his 
commitment to Carey’s system.
8  The administration and Congress could have had little doubt 
about the content of the report they had solicited: lower internal taxes and sustained protection 
for manufactures. 
  In the first year their expectation was proved right.  The Revenue Commission 
accomplished its task and two bills were reported in Congress that followed, more or less, its 
recommendations.  An internal revenue bill made large reductions in excise taxes; a tariff bill 
maintained protection.  The internal revenue bill became law on July 13, 1866, while debate on 
the tariff bill continued.   
                                                 
8 Of Colwell, Henry Carey said, “Between us, … there has never been any essential difference” (Dorfman, 1946, p. 
825). 
  20 
  Meanwhile the Commission’s mandate expired.  Wells received two letters from 
Secretary McCulloch on July 16.  The first notified him that “existence of the Revenue 
Commission, of which you are chairman, is by law terminated” and the second, that he was 
“hereby appointed ‘Special Commissioner of the Revenue’ at an annual salary of four thousand 
dollars ($4000) and the traveling expenses necessarily incurred” (Wells, Papers, 16 July 1866).   
  The majority of Congress would soon regret that they kept Wells on.  A further misstep 
was to keep Wells without Colwell; a fatal one was to grant him the travel money.  In the 
summer of 1867 Wells took his inquiries abroad “in the way of obtaining valuable information in 
regard to the industry and the revenue system of England.”  He had already been dismayed by 
the venality of interests engaged in debate over the tariff bill.  For him to travel to the land of 
“British free trade” and the legacy of Richard Cobden was a hazard.  On July 12 McCulloch 
wrote to him that “Some of our high-tariff men are very apprehensive that you will become too 
much indoctrinated with free trade notions by a visit to England” (Wells, Papers, 12 July 1867).  
Their apprehensions were borne out: Wells changed his mind.  Upon his return he joined Perry 
as one of America’s most prominent and vociferous opponents of protective tariffs. 
 
TwoTariff Commissions:1865-70 and1882 
 
“These issues do not at present involve 
either the theory of free trade or the fact of 
protection.  The questions arising are 
practical questions purely ...” 
  “We are practical men, and want only 
facts.” 
     
David A. Wells, Report of December 1869.  
(Wells, 1869, p. lxxi) 
  Commissioner Boteler, in answer to 
testimony for the Report of 1882.  
(Hayes, 1882, p. 2328) 
 
The Special Commissioner of the Revenue, 1865-1870 
 
The tariff bill drawn up from Wells’s first report, which he wrote together with Hayes and 
Colwell, was passed by the House on July 10, 1866.  The report’s recommendation was generally 
to lower internal taxes but retain protective tariffs.  In Congress, however, “the cry to preserve 
the tariffs soon turned in many mouths to one to raise them” (Tarbell, 1911, p. 31).   
Congressmen brought to the floor petitions “praying for an increase of the tariff” on imported 
wines (by California and Illinois grape growers), imported wool (by citizens of Dutchess and 
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Genesee Counties, New York), imported cigars (by Cornelius Cline, an Ohio tobacco 
manufacturer) imported flax (by several citizens of Ohio and New York), imported manufactured 
goods in general (by Philadelphia manufacturers), imported “time paper” (by the Milwaukee 
Chamber of Commerce), imported steel (by several citizens of Ohio), and so on (House Journal, 
39th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 74, 156, 177, 244, 252).  The resulting bill, H. R. 718, was titled “An 
Act to Provide Increased Revenue from Imports, and Other Purposes.”  Most germane were the 
“other purposes,” namely protection for the distressed petitioners. 
  The legislative momentum favoring greater protection compelled the opposition to 
organize.  The American Free Trade League was founded in 1867 in New York City with the 
renowned man of letters William Cullen Bryant as its President and Perry on its General Council.  
The inaugural issue of its newspaper, The League, explained its members’ purpose and 
manifested their zeal: 
             
In the task of giving to four millions of human beings the right to make 
their own contracts in reference to their labor, the government of the 
United States expended several thousands of millions of dollars, and a 
half a million of lives.  A like reform, but cheap and bloodless, remains 
to be wrought, that of restoring to thirty millions of men the exercise of 
their natural right to make their own contracts in reference to the 
products of their labor (Pell, 1867, p. 1). 
 
  The American Free Trade League sponsored lectures and published news and pamphlets 
in support of its cause.  Similar organizations sprouted up throughout the country.  They held up 
the banner of reform inscribed with the ideas of Perry and his compatriots, and advanced it with 
political weight. 
  The weight of economists’ ideas—those of free traders and protectionists alike—was 
evident in discussions on the tariff bill in the press and in Congress.  As the House debated H. R. 
718 in July 1866, Representative Samuel Scott Marshall of Illinois, in opposition to the bill, 
contended that a protective tariff inescapably decreases consumption and therefore “violates 
every sound principle of political economy.”  For support he quoted at length both Francis 
Wayland and “the ablest living writer on political economy in our country,” Perry (Cong. Globe, 
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39th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 285-287).  In the Senate debate the following winter, Senator 
Alexander Gilmore Cattell of New Jersey, in favor of the bill, insisted on the “utter fallacy of the 
usual and clamorous free-trade argument that under all circumstances all duties for protection are 
a tax upon the consumer” (Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 633-643).  Ultimately “it is 
competition and development at home that produce lower prices,” he argued:  
 
Will not the encouragement given by protection invite capital into 
manufactures; attract to our shores the skilled workmen of other lands; 
stimulate enterprise and quicken the activities of our people, until the 
manufacturer will find a sharper competition at his own door than the 
one three thousand miles away? (Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2nd sess., 
pp. 633-643) 
 
Accordingly he disclaimed “the speculations of Adam Smith and Say and their disciples” and for 
support cited Carey, among others (ibid., p. 638). 
  Because Cattell spoke on January 22, 1867, it was unremarkable that he referred to Wells 
as “the highly intelligent and eminently faithful special commissioner” (ibid., p. 640).  Wells’s 
tour of England was still six months away.  Between January and July protection would suffer a 
setback: specifically, the defeat of the tariff bill, after the Senate passed it with amendments and 
returned it to the House, due to tactical bungling and despite a solid majority in its favor.   
Nevertheless the section of the bill that increased tariffs on wool and woolens—the industries 
whose claims had, at the moment, the greatest support—was passed as a separate initiative.  
There was reason to expect that the rest would follow in the next Congress (Stanwood, 1903, pp. 
154-158, 170).   
  The expectation’s disappointment was foreshadowed in a popular pamphlet by Edward 
Atkinson, a prominent Massachusetts industrialist and ally of Perry’s.  Some defense against 
special interests and wrong doctrines could be rallied by enlightening public opinion to the true 
principles of political economy, Atkinson hoped.  But more immediate defense might be found in 
none other than Wells: “His convictions are evidently changing somewhat, and I believe that a 
man of his ability, and with the opportunity which he has for observing the evils of legislation for 
special interests, cannot long avoid being a convert” (Atkinson, 1867, p. 5). 
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  Wells’s conversion—and the vexation of Cattell and his colleagues—happened in steps.  
In the report for 1867 he and his co-authors had stated “that a removal of all the internal taxes 
which materially impede production, with, possibly, some slight modifications of the tariff, will 
be followed by an immediate and great revival of domestic industry” (Wells 1867, p. 30).  The 
statement already reflected the ebbing of Wells’s protectionist sympathies, yet it was bland by 
his standards to come.  One might have taken him to mean that in the particular circumstances 
he called for a tariff reduction, but he had no prejudice of how to revise it the following year.  In 
the report for 1868 his message was different: free trade was known a priori to be salutary.  “In 
fact,” he wrote, “our present tariff is in many particulars apparently based upon the old fallacy 
that, in the exchange of commodities between nations, which constitute commerce, what one 
gains the other loses.  It needs but a moment’s thought to be convinced that there can be no 
permanent trade or commerce unless it is for the gain of both nations” (1868b, p. 80).    
  Wells’s report provoked a furor among many of his former supporters and propelled the 
public debate on tariff policy.  Theories and theoreticians of free trade and protection were at the 
very center of the debate.  In his historical interpretation of the American mind, Henry Steele 
Commager (1950, p. 9) wrote that “theories and speculations disturbed the American, and he 
avoided abstruse philosophies of government or conduct as healthy men avoid medicines. ... In 
politics, too, he profoundly mistrusted the abstract and doctrinaire.”  That the statement is partly 
true is evidenced in the widespread use of the word “theory” as an epithet.  That it is importantly 
false is evidenced in the vehemence with which parties on both sides of the debate (not least 
those who articulated obviously distinguishable theories) leveled the word at each other.  A 
sampler: William D. Kelley, Republican of Pennsylvania, adherent to the views of Carey and 
leader of the protectionist side in Congress, objected that Wells had marshaled his figures “to 
sustain a foregone conclusion and advocate a favorite theory of his own” (Cong. Globe, 40th 
Cong., 3rd sess., p. 452).  Anticipating the criticism, Wells had already insisted in his report that 
he wrote it “with a view not of establishing or confirming any particular theory” (Wells 1868a, 
p. 1).  Wells’s friend Rep. James Garfield added that Kelley’s real objection was that the report’s 
“facts and deductions do not square with [Kelley’s] theories and notions” (Cong. Globe, 40th 
Cong., 3rd sess., p. 454).  Kelley redoubled his effort, denouncing the report more vociferously 
as “the vain imaginings of a dreamy and indolent theorist” (ibid., appendix p. 120) and later 
supporting a measure that would cease payment of Wells’s salary.  Garfield wrote to Wells in 
  24 
sympathetic indignation, “What does this raid signify?  This only; they have created an office by 
law and appointed an officer whose duty it is to find facts and report conclusions on our 
Industrial and Financial Interests, but, he must find facts to satisfy these people and his 
conclusions must support their theories, or they will not tolerate him” (Garfield, Papers, 24 Feb. 
1869, italics mine throughout). 
  The theories proffered and protested by Commissioner Wells and the Congress were 
carried into the newspapers.  Horace Greeley’s New York Daily Tribune published a series of 
thirteen open letters by Henry Carey containing the eminent protectionist’s rebuttal of Wells’s 
report.  First, he disputed Wells’s interpretation of recent economic history: if protection had 
inhibited American prosperity, then “Why is it that the closing years of every anti-protective 
tariff have exhibited scenes of public and private bankruptcy and ruin?” (Carey, 1869, p. 54).  
Second, he impugned Wells as an agent of British interests that stood to gain from free trade at 
Americans’ expense.  Finally he reiterated his longstanding theoretical argument in favor of 
protection.  The progress of wealth, Carey reiterated, depends on the intensive cultivation of land 
in densely populated areas where commerce promotes the division of labor, and with it 
innovation and new techniques for yet more intensive cultivation.  When people are given 
incentives to trade with others faraway instead of near, they spread themselves thin, extending 
cultivation extensively instead of intensively.  Resources are wasted on transportation.  The 
innovative benefits of agglomeration, which can be realized only by “placing the consumer by 
the side of the producer” (Carey [1847] 1872, p. 103), are foregone.  “Are you in future to stand 
before the world,” Carey challenged Wells, 
 
as advocate of the great British capitalists who would compel our 
farmers to make all their exchanges in Liverpool; or of the farmer 
himself who seeks to have the market brought so near to home as to 
enable him to free his land and himself from that terrific “tax” of 
transportation by means of which he, in the past, has been so nearly 
ruined? (Carey, 1869, p. 55). 
 
  At the same time that Carey’s letters went to press, his patron at the Tribune, publisher 
Horace Greeley, was preparing a protectionist treatise of his own (1870).  For free traders, 
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meanwhile, debate over Wells’s report was merging into general anticipation of what might be 
accomplished with the new Congress and the recently inaugurated President Grant.  Both sides 
pressed their views; Arthur Latham Perry met Greeley for a debate in Boston in the fall of 1869.   
  Perry propounded from the podium his catallactics.  Since trade could only proceed if 
two traders were willing, it was necessarily beneficial, and the conclusion was not altered if one 
of them happened to be a native and the other a foreigner.  So, “for Government to thrust in a 
protective duty, shutting the foreigner out; and what is the same thing, shutting the native in, is to 
destroy an otherwise inevitable gain.  Gain destroyed is loss incurred, and this loss is an 
uncompensated loss—a dead loss” (The New York Times, 12 October 1869b).  Greeley made at 
least seven concise counter-arguments, ranging from partly to mostly theoretical.  First, free 
trade was the doctrine of slave-holders, for an advocate of slavery “was never known who was 
not a free trader at heart.”  Second, tariff increases had successfully ended periods of distress in 
the past.  Third, protection fostered manufactures, which provided a home market for agricultural 
products.  Fourth, protection was necessary because “there is an infancy to manufactures” during 
which they cannot withstand foreign competition.  Fifth, as Alexander Hamilton had 
demonstrated in his Report on Manufactures ([1791] 1921), prices of protected manufactures 
decline over time.  Sixth, to produce manufactures is to reduce transport costs, because 
manufactured goods are cheaper to ship than agriculture.  Seventh, industrial diversification, 
which protection makes feasible, improves the education of the people. 
  Belying Greeley’s first argument, a wedge had already begun to divide the Republican 
Party as its business constituents backed protection while abolitionists favored free trade.  Anti-
slavery luminaries William Lloyd Garrison, Henry Ward Beecher, and William Cullen Bryant 
extended the principles of their cause seamlessly to free trade.  Beecher shared a public stage 
with Perry and announced that “after a decade of years we are coming back to the discussion of 
principles.”  “The doctrine of liberty should be extended to more than the civil state,” he 
continued, referring to emancipation; “it should apply to commercial interests also” (The New 
York Times, 13 April 1869c).  At a meeting of the American Free Trade League, Bryant 
declaimed, “We talk of free labor; but what is free labor if we are not permitted a free exchange 
of the fruits of our labor?” (The New York Times, 1 May 1869a). 
  The wedge was widened by some Western Republicans who also resisted Greeley’s other 
arguments.  General Roeliff Brinkerhoff wrote a free trade plank into the party platform at the 
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Republican County Convention of Mansfield, Ohio, and attracted national attention when his 
speech defending the platform published by the Cincinnati Commercial (15 June 1869d).   
Seizing the opportunity to give their cause political effect, the American Free Trade League 
enlisted Brinkerhoff and Perry for a campaign of public meetings and speeches beginning 
November in Detroit, Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Louis, Springfield (Illinois), Indianapolis, 
Cincinnati, and Dayton (Brinkerhoff, 1904, p. 195).  The events circulated free trade ideas and 
supported sister leagues in some of the host cities to maintain the political pressure for tariff 
reform. 
  Opposing leagues countered the campaign.  The secretary of the American Industrial 
League, Giles Stebbins, heard Brinkerhoff and Perry in Detroit and published his response. 
Stebbins had an immediate political end in sight: a tariff reduction called the “free breakfast 
table” that was exactly the opposite of the reduction sought by free traders.  It aimed specifically 
to reduce duties on imported goods that were unlikely to be produced domestically, like coffee 
and tea, and maintain them on the rest.  Stebbins inveighed against Perry mainly for his “scheme 
to benefit foreign manufactures and New York importers at the cost and peril of our enterprise 
and industry” (Stebbins, 1869, p. 7).  But he also invoked Alexander Hamilton, as Greeley had 
done, arguing that protection for import-competing goods would cause their prices to fall as the 
protected enterprises grew and improved their techniques.  Hamilton’s scenario, he wrote, 
“accords with the reason of the thing and with experience” (Stebbins, 1869, p. 2).  Let coffee and 
tea be reduced, he offered, but do not touch woolens and steel.  
  While the debate carried on so did Wells.  His report of December, 1869, found—to 
nobody’s further surprise—that the prevailing tariff, which reflected “the will of highly 
organized and aggressive associations of capitalists,” was “excessive and unnecessary, and 
opposed alike to the highest interests of civilization and humanity” (Wells, 1869, p. lxxii).  Nor 
was the report’s reception surprising.  Among Wells’s allies, Perry responded by writing him a 
congratulatory letter assuring that “this Report will be our Bible in our future onslaughts on the 
monopolists” (Wells Papers, 31 Dec. 1869).  Among his opponents, General Robert Schenck, 
Republican chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, responded with a tariff bill that 
bore some resemblance to the free breakfast table but very little to Wells’s recommendations.  In 
speeches supporting the bill, Schenck and his allies targeted both Perry and Wells.  Perry was 
said to be paid from “the deep coffers of the British manufacturer” to “teach the people how 
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much better were the speculations of the theorizers than the lessons of experience.”  Wells was 
derided for changing his better views for the worse: “it will be entirely safe to leave Wells the 
free trader to the tender mercies of Wells the protectionist” (Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2nd sess., 
pp. 2004-2005). 
  The main provisions of Schenck’s bill became law in July of 1870.  The act was a victory 
for protectionists compounded by their ridding themselves of Wells’s nuisance: the office of the 
Special Commissioner of the Revenue was eliminated by President Grant’s refusal to renew it 
(Tarbell, 1911, p. 69).   
  The end of Wells’s commission did not end the tariff debate in Congress, much less in 
college classrooms, public meetings, and the press.  Nonetheless, it marks a good point to leave 
off before rejoining the protagonists a dozen years later.  Did the ideas that they debated change 
in the interim? 
 
The Tariff Commission of 1882 
   
After passage of the Schenck bill, Perry and Brinkerhoff toured again with a more pointed 
message.  Decades later author Thomas Beer ([1929] 1941, p. 430) wrote that the Union’s 
provisions for the Civil War, followed by westward expansion and railroad land grants, produced 
“a certain frame of mind infecting principled men: the government came to be a source of help 
for private enterprise, of subsidies and candid gifts.”   Reformers diagnosed protective tariffs as a 
symptom of the same infection.  Brinkerhoff exposed the Salt Company of Onondaga, in upstate 
New York—“The Tyrants of Syracuse”—as a case study of tariffs as de facto monopoly grants 
to businessmen (Brinkerhoff, 1904, p. 203).  Perry, too, stressed arguments depicting the tariff as 
class legislation for a favored few.  He took added care to specify who benefited, who was hurt, 
and how.  The Nebraska State Board of Agriculture invited him to Omaha in 1874 to make it 
plain.  “So far as the importables are raised in value by protective tariff taxes,” he lectured from 
the pulpit of the First Baptist Church, “the exportables are depressed in value.”  Therefore,  
 
Protection in its best estate is a short-sighted, narrow-minded, prejudice; 
whenever it passes beyond that, it becomes a consciously deceitful 
scheme of plunder, by which a few seek to enrich themselves at the 
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expense of the many.  Those many are mainly the farmers (Perry 1874, 
pp. 16-17).   
     
  The free traders’ continued campaign met setbacks and a modest success.  The revolt 
against Grant’s administration by “Liberal Republicans,” led initially by tariff reformers 
including Brinkerhoff, was usurped with the selection of Horace Greeley, of all candidates, as 
their choice for 1872 (Brinkerhoff, 1904, pp. 214-228).  Nevertheless the reformers’ willingness 
to defect from the party heightened “the alarm which possessed many of the Republican leaders 
who were watching the apparently rapid progress of free trade ideas” (Stanwood, 1903, p. 181).  
Alarm spurred compromise.  Party leaders extended a concession to the reformers in hope of 
stemming, at one stroke, any further defections of Grant’s erstwhile supporters and any grave 
unraveling of the protective system.  A ten percent reduction in duties on manufactured goods 
became law in June. 
  The success was short lived.  A commercial panic in 1873 diminished government 
receipts, giving tariff supporters grounds to call for a repeal of the previous year’s reduction—in 
the name of revenue, not protection.  They had to carry out the repeal before the Republican 
majority vanished with the new Congress on March 4, 1875.  They did, and President Grant 
signed the bill on March 3.  The act raised once again the ratio of duties to dutiable imports to 
well over forty percent, not far below its height during the Civil War.  It was the last significant 
piece of tariff legislation until the early 1880s. 
  The revenue, by that time, was an embarrassment of riches for the high tariff supporters.  
David Wells argued that it was a positive danger.  Within four years, by his estimation, the 
Treasury would have retired all the remaining debt payable at its option and would be forced to 
purchase at a heavy premium what remained.  Retirement of the remaining debt would 
extinguish the capital of private banks and compel them to withdraw their notes from circulation, 
inducing a “spasmodic contraction” (Wells, 1881, p. 614).   
  Yet as Wells saw it, a new commission that was being considered by Congress to study 
and issue recommendations for Federal tax reform was actually a hindrance to any remedy.  
Nothing would be done during 1882, he understood, while the commission would be conducting 
its study; and in 1883 the Forty-Seventh Congress would not have time to complete a thorough 
revision of the revenue before its adjournment in March.  To Wells’s mind the plan was a ruse, a 
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“most admirable pretext and occasion for delay and obstruction,” a “dodge to prevent any 
reconstruction or reduction of the existing tariff” (Wells, 1881, pp. 620, 622).  Even worse was 
the commission’s proposed composition.  The bill under consideration provided for it to be filled 
with “practical men.”  Wells interpreted the term to mean men representing the interests of 
particular industries—in which case the commission would be nothing more than another 
“scheme for making the prospective reform in Federal taxation subservient to private rather than 
public interests” (Wells 1881, p. 621). 
           The motif of practicality in opposition to theory did not, in itself, represent a change from 
the debate of a dozen years before.  The change was the opening of a meta-debate, with new 
participants, about the natural order that inhered in the arguments of both Perry and Carey— 
particularly about the foundations of their knowledge of the presumed order.  To Henry Steele 
Commager the meta-debate was concerned with clearing away “the jungle of theology and 
metaphysics and deterministic science” to allow “the warm sun of common sense to quicken the 
American spirit” (1950, p. 97).  It took place apart from, if not independently of, the policy arena 
where free trade and protection remained at odds. Nevertheless its effect was felt there: increased 
strength accrued to whichever argumentative hand could be played as “practical,” free of 
theoretical presumptions.  Protectionists proved more adept at playing theirs as such, sometimes 
even conceding that their opponents’ arguments were true in theory but dismissing them as false 
in practice.  Free traders responded defensively.  A newcomer in the 1870s, William Graham 
Sumner of Yale, framed the response: the first sentence of his “Argument Against Protective 
Taxes” (1881, p. 241) read, “the most absurd assertion which can be put into language is that a 
thing (e.g., free trade) is true in theory but is false in practice.”  David Wells (1882, p. 11) 
lectured almost identically, “nothing can be more absurd and unfounded than the assertion which 
to a certain extent has become popular that a thing may be true in theory and yet false in 
application and practice.”  But the free trade hand fared no better for their saying so. 
  The Tariff Commission, once approved and appointed, was even more practical than 
Wells had feared.  He had anticipated in a panel of nine at least “three truly representative 
members of the anti-protection party” (Wells, 1881, p. 625).  In the event there was, as chair, 
John L. Hayes of Massachusetts, Secretary of the National Association of Wool Manufacturers; 
joining him, an iron manufacturer, a wool grower, a sugar grower, an officer of the New York 
Customs House, and three former members of Congress from Ohio, Virginia, and Georgia, all 
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with protectionist sympathies; and a statistician from the Census Office who “had been at one 
time strongly inclined to free trade” (Stanwood, 1903, p. 204).   
  Their mandate, as enacted by Congress in May, was to make recommendations for the 
“establishment of a judicious tariff, or a revision of the existing tariff upon a scale of justice to 
all interests” by December (Hayes, 1882, p. 4).  The commissioners adopted additional 
guidelines.   Their recommendations would “serve no particular party, class, section, or school of 
political economy.”  They would shun abstractions and come “face to face with the most 
practical questions within the range of national economics.”  Specifically, 
 
The practical question presented to the Commission is that of 
reconciling the interests of revenue, including the considerations of its 
sufficient maintenance or possible reduction, with justice to the interests 
of the nation involved in the preservation of its industries and the 
security of its labor (Hayes, 1882, p. 4). 
 
  The commissioners began taking testimony in New Jersey in mid-July and continued for 
two and a half months.  Over one five week period they traveled six thousand miles, taking 
testimony in twenty-five cities from Rochester to Minneapolis to Atlanta to Philadelphia (Hayes, 
1882, pp. 2-3).  In total they interviewed over six hundred witnesses, nearly all of them 
manufacturers and businessmen testifying to the necessity of tariffs in their particular lines of 
work.  To the charge that the interviews constituted not a study but a sham, Edward Stanwood, in 
his history of American tariff controversies (1903, pp. 205-206), defended the commissioners 
with the reminder that “the witnesses were not selected by the commissioners, but were 
volunteers, and if few men appeared to urge more radical reduction of the tariff than was 
recommended, the fault was their own.”  At least one free trader, however, anticipated the 
defense and acted.  He turned up in Philadelphia, having traveled there from New Haven, 
intending less to “urge a more radical reduction” than to rebuke the commission for their flagrant 
stupidity in considering anything less.   
  The record of William Graham Sumner’s testimony to the Tariff Commission is triply 
valuable.  His prepared statement provides a record of one of the principal arguments for free 
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trade circa 1882, and his dialog with the commissioners afterwards offers both a record of the 
clash of free trade and protectionist ideas and farcical entertainment.   
  The first burden of Sumner’s argument was to prove that a protective tariff lowers wages 
overall rather than raising them, and that if some workers’ wages rose they did so only at the 
expense of others more numerous.  “I have noticed that in the discussions which have taken 
place before this Commission there has been a constant reiteration of some false doctrines of 
theoretical political economy about wages,” Sumner began.  “If there is to be any theoretical 
political economy admitted, it is worthwhile to have it correct” (Hayes, 1882, p. 2313).  The 
tariff is a tax, he insisted, and while taxes may be necessary to pay for security and peace, they 
can never increase the total of goods produced because they discourage production by the most 
efficient producers of the most valued products.  With fewer goods produced by existing capital 
and labor, “until somebody invents an arithmetic according to which 10 will go into 70 more 
times than it will in 100, it is certain that smaller dividend will give a smaller share to each 
person” (ibid., pp. 2316-2317).  Protection therefore lowers wages.  The conclusion, he 
maintained, is mathematically demonstrable: it could not be escaped by “a thousand 
commissions, sitting for ten years, and actually engaging in a real study of the industries of this 
country,” let alone by the lesser men facing him. 
  Sumner’s second burden was to distinguish “a tariff for revenue only,” which free traders 
accepted, from a protective tariff, which they condemned.  The distinction was not new, but he 
thought it should be reasserted because tariff supporters had been arguing that it was 
questionable.  It was widely held that tariffs, no matter how high or low, brought “revenue with 
incidental protection.”  If so, then it followed that those who complained about protection were, 
in effect, just advocating reduction of revenue; and those who called for a “tariff for revenue 
only” were chasing a phantom.  This was clearly the view of the commissioners—and it led, after 
Sumner completed his prepared statement, to the following exchange. 
 
Commissioner Duncan F. Kenner: ... Our object is to find the best 
system of revenue. 
Sumner: Then abolish all protective taxes.  
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Kenner: Without regard to the $250,000,000 or $300,000,000, that it is 
necessary to raise for the support of government?  What would you 
recommend in the place of the present tariff system? 
Sumner: You have a large number of revenue taxes, and if you strike 
out half of them and divide the rest by two you would double the 
revenue, if you want more revenue. 
Kenner: Divide which taxes by two? 
Sumner: All you have got—the whole tariff system, the whole intricate 
import tariff duties that we have.  Strike half of them off the list and 
lower the rest to one half of what they are now and you will double the 
revenue. 
Kenner: I thought you said just now that we should abolish all revenue 
taxes? 
Sumner: All protective taxes. 
Kenner: All import duties? 
Sumner: I never said that; I said all protective taxes. 
Kenner: I understood you to say abolish all protective taxes, and I 
understood you to mean by that all import duties. 
Sumner: Oh, no; I do not mean that. 
Kenner: I wish you would be more explicit then. 
Sumner: I am as explicit as a man can be. 
 
(Hayes, 1882, pp. 2325-2326) 
 
                          
  Sumner was mistaken: further questioning made his view more explicit.  “Revenue and 
protection are entirely exclusive of each other,” he insisted, “and never can overlap one another 
at all” (Hayes 1882, p. 2329).  Apart from being imposed for different purposes—revenue tariffs, 
to perform the basic functions of government; protective tariffs, to favor a particular person or 
class—they are levied differently.  A tariff placed on an imported item that is not produced 
domestically, he argued, is for revenue.  It cannot be protective because there is no domestic  
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producer to protect.  A tariff placed on an imported item that is also produced in the U.S. is 
protective unless offset by an equal excise tax on the domestic product.   
  In short, Sumner defined a protective tariff as one that favors domestic producers of 
particular items over foreign producers.  Such a tariff can never appropriately be said to be “for 
revenue,” his thinking ran, because there is always an alternative tax, at a lower rate, that (1) 
would not favor domestic producers of the item, and (2) would garner more revenue.  (And (3) 
would allow greater total consumption of goods, besides.) 
  Sumner did not budge the commissioners, however, from their conviction that his 
recommendation was utterly impractical.  He entrenched them in it.  “Of course you do not 
object to our receiving your communication ... under the well-known saying that ‘granting a 
logician his premises he can reach any conclusion he wishes’?” asked Commissioner Kenner.  
He and others continued, “Our purpose is to arrive at the truth,” “Our purpose is to get at the 
facts,” “We are practical men with a practical object in view,” “We are practical men, and want 
only facts,” and “The Commission is composed of practical men, and ... when you make such 
very radical suggestions as you have made, we want to see how far you can substantiate them” 
(Hayes, 1882, pp. 2323-2325, 2327-2328, 2331). 
  The claims of practicality are noteworthy for their perfect Bounderbarianness, but they 
did not signal a credible eschewal of theory any more than they did when the claimants included 
Wells in the late 1860s.
9  George Basil Dixwell, an astute critic who rebutted Sumner’s 
testimony in print soon after the event, denounced him similarly as impractical.  Sumner’s 
reasoning on the subject, he maintained, could not match that of “statesmen and educated 
business men, all of whom have been pupils of the professors and afterwards pupils in the great 
school of practical life, where they often learn to doubt and then to discard much which had been 
learned at college” (Dixwell, 1882, p. 5).  But as Dixwell proceeded to carve up Sumner’s 
testimony, his instruments, while arguably “practical,” were far from atheoretical.  He found 
fault in the first place with Sumner’s assumption that, under a reduced tariff that induced 
 
9 Although it might seem ironic today, it would not have seemed so at the time to associate the satirized 
personification of Political Economy in Charles Dickens’s Hard Times, Josiah Bounderby, with the protectionists as 
much or even more than the free traders. Indeed, Dickens was among the contributors to the purchase for 
Westminster Abbey of a memorial bust of Richard Cobden, the renowned British parliamentarian and popularizer of 
free trade whose methods were studied carefully by his American counterparts (Howe, 1997, pp. 143-44, note 204). 
That the seeming irony is misapprehended is a succinct expression of the larger story that I am telling here.  
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Americans to produce more agriculture and import more manufactures, the price of agriculture 
would not fall and the price of manufactures would not rise.  “Theory,” he wrote, citing J. S. 
Mill, “negatives this assumption” (Dixwell, 1882, p. 22).  Dixwell did not rely solely on a terms-
of-trade argument, though.  “The truth,” he continued, “is as follows”: 
 
Protection prevents a vast number of people from flying to the land, and 
makes them consumers instead of producers of raw products. ... 
Protection therefore secures to the laborer the advantage which he has by 
nature in this country, and increases it by diversifying employments.   
Consequently it raises wages above what they could be under foreign 
competition.  At the same time it hastens the moment when increasing 
skill may compensate for the higher moneyed cost of labor; for high 
wages lead to greater efforts and intelligence on the part of operatives, 
and to greater care in selecting the most skilful on the part of employers, 
and to a more extensive use of the very best machinery (Dixwell, 1882, 
pp. 22-23).   
 
Again he appealed to Mill, but in stressing the desirability of geographic concentration, industrial 
diversity, and the technological progress presumed to accompany both, his argument was more 
evocative of Carey’s.  In either case it was thoroughly theoretical. 
            The controversy that began with the Tariff Commission’s creation and composition, and 
continued through Sumner’s testimony, did not subside with the appearance of the report.  The 
commissioners’ recommendations were detailed, running line by line of the tariff schedule, and 
the changes they suggested were far from uniform.  Readings of the report varied with the 
inclinations of the readers.  To ardent protectionists, as well as the commissioners themselves, it 
recommended a “substantial reduction” of 20 to 25 percent (Hayes, 1882, p. 6); to thoroughgoing 
free traders it recommended an increase in disguise.  Protectionist historian Stanwood (1903, p. 
206) saw in it rates that were generally “left untouched, or reduced from a slight amount to 40 or 
50 percent.”  Muckraking historian Ida Tarbell (1911, pp. 107-108) saw in its ostensible 
reductions “an admirable basis to work on,” although inconsistencies and several proposed 
increases signaled that the Commission “had by no means lived up to it.”  Perry (1887, p. 575) 
considered it “a marvel” that “provided that cow’s hair should come in as wool,” and the 
Brooklyn Revenue Reform Club (Shearman, 1882, p. 3) read it as a “fraudulent revision” that 
was “carried out by pretended reductions, which would in fact ... not diminish the extortions of 
the protected few.” 
  The Senate and House took up the report simultaneously and began to craft bills.  Rep. 
Kelley, who had opposed Wells when he was Special Commissioner of the Revenue and who 
was now chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, had a problem.   Democrats and even 
most Republicans were willing to vote for a bill reflecting the recommendations of the Tariff 
Commission—the ostensible 20 percent reduction—but Kelley would permit no such reduction.  
The bill that Kelley presented, which reduced tariffs considerably less than the Commission 
recommended, stirred too much opposition from reformers for its debate to come to an end in the 
time remaining to the 47th Congress.  Stalemate had been the intention of high tariff supporters 
all along, if Wells’s warning about the Tariff Commission in 1881 is to be believed.  Certainly 
most of the industry lobbyists who gathered at Washington to urge no reduction would not have 
minded that outcome.  But the general sentiment for some revision was now sufficiently strong 
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that President Arthur threatened to call Congress back for an additional session if no bill was 
forthcoming (Tarbell, 1911, pp. 113, 121-122). 
  A parliamentary maneuver solved Kelley’s problem.  The House bill was replaced with 
the Senate bill, the Senate bill was declared at the same moment unsatisfactory, and the task of 
reconciling the two chambers was delegated to a conference committee whose appointees 
favored protection.  Kelley had succeeded in producing a bill to his liking that included 
numerous revisions but, on net, no substantial reduction (Taussig, 1892, pp. 230-250). 
  Tariff reformers, whose ranks would grow in the next Congress with a new majority of 
Democrats in the House, made it known that passage of the bill would not forestall them from 
revisiting the issue.  “Sir,” William Morrison of Illinois addressed the Speaker on the last day of 
debate, “the advocates of protective and selfish greed here and everywhere but deceive 
themselves if they expect from this measure so much as temporary settlement of the questions 
for which they seek oblivion” (Cong. Record, 47th Cong., 3rd sess., appendix p. 278).  He kept 
his word.  As the new chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, Morrison reported, in 
March 1884, a bill to cut tariffs 20 percent across the board.  His bill was a challenge to 
Congress to accomplish in fact what the Commission had claimed to intend. 
  Ideas of free trade and protection were taken up once again.  Rep. Samuel S. Cox of New 
York repeated ably Sumner’s argument that protection cannot increase wages: “You can never 
by any legislation advance the rate of wages one cent beyond what supply and demand may 
prescribe, but you can reduce—as for years past you have done—the purchasing power of wages 
to more than the full extent of your tariff rates” (Cong. Record, 48th Cong., 1st sess., appendix p. 
8).  If the latter part of Cox’s speech was Sumner’s, however, the rest was Perry’s.  When Perry 
had condemned the tariff as class legislation in Nebraska in 1874 he had made his case with data 
from the 1870 census.  Although tariffs could raise temporarily the wages of workers in the 
protected lines of work, he had reasoned, those workers—manufacturing workers—represented 
just 21.67 percent of the workforce.  Agricultural workers represented 47.36 percent.  At best, 
Perry had said, the tariff benefited one-fifth of the population, hurt egregiously nearly one half, 
and made living costly for the other three-tenths (Perry, 1874, p. 4). 
  Cox maintained the argument with the 1880 census numbers.  They had changed only 
slightly: 22.06 percent of the workforce was now employed in manufacturing industries, 44.1 
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percent in agriculture, and 33.84 percent in professional services, trade and transportation.
10  
Perry’s point remained unchanged.  The tariff, Cox declared, was naked redistributive class 
legislation.  Specifically, it redistributed income from the majority of citizens engaged in 
agriculture and services to a minority engaged in manufacturing.  Generally, it redistributed from 
workers to employers.  “The employers have been growing rich, the laborers poorer,” proclaimed 
Cox, condemning the “tariff robbery, which fosters monopoly” (Cong. Record, 48th Cong., 1st 
sess., appendix p. 6).  The Morrison bill offered such modest relief that it “retains 80 per cent. of 
iniquity and awards 20 per cent. of justice,” but even so the protectionist interests would not 
budge: “Moneybags is afraid to move lest he burst” (ibid., appendix pp. 9-10). 
  Protectionists answered, as they had before, that the tariff supported the high wages of 
American workers relative to the “pauper labor” of Europe.  They also answered, as before, that 
the proposed reduction favored English interests above all.  “Give us as cheap labor as they have 
in England (which I do not want) and we need no protection,” said Rep. William McKinley to 
applause (Cong. Record, 48th Cong., 1st sess., appendix p. 139).  “This Congress is to-day 
engaged in an effort to help England, not America, to build up English manufacturers at the 
expense of our own (ibid., appendix p. 138).   
  Still, the free traders’ points about agricultural prices and wages had to be parried.  Here 
the practicality claimed by protectionists had a practical manifestation: they used more statistics 
to buttress their claim that farmers, too, benefited from a high tariff than free traders used to deny 
it.  Rep. Horatio Bisbee of Florida showed some deference to “Professor Perry, of Williams 
College, one of the great theoretical apostles and advocates of free trade” (Cong. Record, 48th 
Cong., 1st sess., appendix p. 175)—but nevertheless dismissed him because “facts and practical 
results are better than theories on this subject” (ibid., appendix p. 176).  In six tables of statistics 
he demonstrated that in nearly all occupations, including farming, wages were higher in 
protected America than in Europe; that prices of the “necessaries of life” were lower in America 
and those of fabrics had fallen; and that agricultural wages, and the value of agricultural lands 
and products, were greatest in those states with sizeable manufacturing industries.  Yet statistics 
complemented, rather than supplanted, theory.  “The farmer,” Bisbee concluded,  
                                                 
10 The statistics are derived from numbers that Cox presented to the same effect. 
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should encourage manufacturing interests in his own State and 
neighborhood, and thereby create a market near his door for what he has to 
sell, and at the same time create the supply of manufactured products 
which he has to purchase in the vicinity of his own farm.  He can do this 
by maintaining a protective tariff.  By abolishing it, and the consequent 
destruction of manufacturing interests in this country, our entire 
population must seek employment in agricultural pursuits; the home 
market for the products of the soil is destroyed; the people of foreign 
countries must be depended upon to purchase what the farmers do not 
themselves consume, and to sell us what of manufactured articles we have 
to buy. (Cong. Record, 48th Cong., 1st sess., appendix p. 179) 
 
  In similar fashion Rep. Moses A. McCoid of Iowa laid out ten tables and the same ideas: 
“there is sound economical philosophy in the doctrine that the prosperity of agriculture must 
come through diversification of industries, in peopling areas of land, by which a large proportion 
of non-agricultural people may be secured to them” (Cong. Record, 48th Cong., 1st sess., 
appendix p. 202).  For evidence he reproduced from a report of the Agricultural Department two 
graphs, one of which is shown in Figure 3.  To draw it states were divided into four classes 
according to the percent of their workers in agriculture.   The average value of farms in each 
class was then plotted as a pyramid—the base of which had length proportional to the percent of 
workers in agriculture.  Protection, which reduced the percent of workers in agriculture, was 
alleged to benefit them: it raised the value of their farms, producing the highest pyramids. Henry 
Carey, who had died five years before, smiled from the heavens.         
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Figure 3. “Value of Farms, Dependent on Diversification of Industry; The Farmer’s 
Income, Highest where Farms are Fewest.” Figure accompanying a speech on the Morrison 
bill by Rep. Moses A. McCoid, Republican of Iowa. 
 
 
  The opponents of the Morrison bill won the skirmish: a large minority of Democrats 
joined nearly all of the Republicans to defeat the bill narrowly.  For nearly thirty years the hopes 
of tariff reformers continued to be frustrated, and protectionists continued to prevail in 
policymaking.  There were some near-reversals, of which one stands out.  President Grover 
Cleveland was attracted to the cause and the political potential of tariff reform: in 1885 he 
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offered Perry the position of Secretary of the Treasury (which Perry declined),
11 and in 1888 he 
made the tariff the primary issue of the campaign for his re-election.  Cleveland’s loss, despite 
winning the popular vote, was interpreted by Republicans as a mandate to push the tariff still 
higher.  The result, the McKinley Bill of 1890, was a victory for protectionists of such magnitude 
that Andrew Carnegie could gloat justifiably, “the cause of free trade has receded, and is now 
confined to the little island of Britain itself and New South Wales, with its pastoral land and one 
million inhabitants” (Carnegie, 1890, p. 52).  The ratio of duties to dutiable imports rose within 
two years to a height even greater than its maximum during the Civil War, or any other year 
since 1830 and the Tariff of Abominations.  
  The foregoing account of the ideas that guided tariff protection from the end of the Civil 
War to its triumph near the end of the century, and the ideas of free trade that combated them 
throughout, should allow us to revisit in conclusion the questions at the essay’s beginning.  Were 
high tariffs in the late-nineteenth century United States the outcome of backlash?  Given the 
answer, what becomes of the lesson about globalization, its inequities, and its future?     
    
Conclusion 
   
“Backlash” may be understood in many ways, as O’Rourke and Williamson (1999) demonstrate.  
They establish that in the 1870s free trade made French workers worse off, but British workers 
better off (pp. 112-113); the same policy had opposite distributive effects, yet O’Rourke and 
Williamson hold that “backlash seemed to be on the rise in both cases” (p. 108).  In France, 
agricultural producers and wage earners were alarmed by their falling incomes; in Britain, 
backers of empire were alarmed by their nation’s declining power in a world of converging 
incomes.  Backlash as O’Rourke and Williamson understand it encompasses other differences, 
too.  French agricultural producers and workers succeeded in turning their country’s policy from 
free trade to protection in the mid-1880s, while the British imperialists did not succeed in 
altering policy significantly.  Furthermore, O’Rourke and Williamson argue that globalization 
                                                 
11 Although the only direct and explicit evidence of the offer that I have seen is Perry’s own word (1899, p. 697), 
there is ample independent corroborating evidence.  It includes a record of Perry’s summons to Washington by 
Cleveland’s private secretary, General Daniel S. Lamont (Papers, Box 88, telegram of 25 Nov. 1885), through the 
intermediation of Perry’s former pupil and prominent attorney Francis Lynde Stetson.  It also includes Perry’s 
telegram to Lamont and letter to Stetson (Cleveland, Papers, 27 Oct.-28 Oct. 1885) declining an obviously 
significant offer that is not named.  The supposed occasion of the offer, the illness of then-Secretary Daniel 
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backlash “was even more powerful in the New World” (p. 117), where, unlike in either Britain or 
France, tariffs protected manufacturing interests and a minority of workers—and where the 
largest country, the United States, did not have an open trade policy in the first place.   
“Backlash” understood in all these ways at once means opposition to the globalization of 
markets, period—whatever are the markets, whatever was the policy originally, whatever is the 
policy that prevails, and whatever is the identity of the disaffected.   
  An expansive understanding of “backlash” for studying the past would be 
unobjectionable were it not for how the term echoes in the present.  In piecing together a lesson 
for today, O’Rourke and Williamson (1999, p. 287) write, “unless politicians worry about who 
gains and who loses, they may be forced by the electorate to stop efforts to strengthen global 
economy links, and perhaps even to dismantle them.”  A close reading of their book reveals that 
what they must mean by “who gains and who loses” is quite general, for the same reason that 
what they mean by “backlash” is general.  But they intend the lesson that they derive for the 
present—and at present “backlash,” and the associated winners and losers, is perceived 
specifically.  Backlash may be understood in many ways, that is to say, but it is understood 
mostly in one way.  The protectionist pressures exerted upon trade policy by particular classes 
and industries have been more or less contained, as Douglas Irwin (2002) has argued 
persuasively.  The globalization backlash that persists—the one that claims popular attention and 
that may have a decisive effect on policy—is the one conceived as a rebellion against the 
powerful by the bereft of power, against the moneyed by the dispossessed.  Globalization 
backlash today is witnessed in the protests in Seattle, Quebec City, and Genoa.  Globalization 
backlash today is what Noam Chomsky, in his collection of essays titled Profit Over People 
(1999, p. 113), calls a “popular struggle to erode and dismantle forms of oppression and 
domination,” which forms are thought to consist in large part of the influence of corporations in 
the formation of trade policy.  Inverting Chomsky’s title to the same effect, globalization 
backlash today is pictured in the photograph below, taken a few blocks from the summit in 
Quebec City to advance the Free Trade Area of the Americas. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Manning, is also supported by correspondence between Manning (1886) and Cleveland (Papers, 25 Nov. 1885).  
Manning died in office in 1887. 
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Figure 4. Globalization backlash in Quebec City, 21 April 2001.  Protest against the FTAA, 




  If Figure 4 manifests globalization backlash in the present, then globalization backlash in 
the nineteenth century as it will be understood in the present is manifested in Figure 1, the 
picture with which this essay began. 
  I have tried to show what is wrong with that picture.  O’Rourke and Williamson and 
other economic historians demonstrate that the relation of foreign trade to economic interests in 
the United States would have made the picture’s appearance improbable.  I have tried to 
demonstrate that it was beyond improbable.  It was unthinkable.  The ideas that would have been 
necessary to conceive of such a picture had no currency. 
  Supporters of protection proffered several theories to support their policy, drawing from 
the writings of Hamilton, Mill, and especially Carey.  Stated concisely the theories reduced to the 
following propositions.  (1) Protection was beneficial because only if industries were sheltered 
from foreign competition in their infancy could they grow to produce more efficiently and 
  43 
cheaply.  Eventually their prices would fall below the prices of imports.  (2) Protection would 
decrease reliance on British manufactures and increase demand for American substitutes.   
Anything less would serve British interests, not American.  (3) Protection would prevent 
American wages from being reduced to the “pauper wages” of Britain.  (4) Protection had been 
on the right side of the Civil War—whereas free trade had always served the sectional interests 
of the South, and was therefore tainted by slavery.  (5) Protection was necessary to promote 
industrial diversity and thereby provide “home markets” for agricultural products and 
manufactured products alike.  (6) By providing agriculture a home market, protection raised the 
values of agricultural lands and crops.  (7) Protection promoted geographic concentration.   
Industrial diversity and geographic concentration together contributed to technological progress.  
(8) Protection allowed consumers to save the transportation costs that they would otherwise have 
to pay for imports.  (9) Protection maintained advantageous terms of foreign trade, raising the 
relative price of agricultural exports and lowering that of manufactured imports. (10) Protection, 
to some degree, was an inevitable result of collecting revenue from tariffs.  One could not oppose 
protection without also opposing the collection of revenue, and therefore endangering the 
national finances. 
  Free traders advanced fewer theories and fewer but more coherent propositions.  The 
propositions, articulated and applied by chiefly by William Graham Sumner, David A. Wells, 
and Arthur Latham Perry, were these.  (1) In the natural order of the world, in which people were 
unencumbered by legislated restrictions on trade, their different abilities led them to specialize in 
production and trade to their mutual advantage.  Production and consumption were thereby 
maximized.  Restrictions of trade reduced people’s incomes, and restrictions of international 
trade were no different. (2) If protection increased the incomes of some, it did so only at the 
expense of others.  (3) To increase the income of some people at the expense of others was not a 
legitimate function of government.  It interfered with the natural order.  (4) A tariff for revenue 
was different from a protective tariff and was not incompatible with free trade.  Revenue tariffs 
were not established with the motive of restricting trade, they were not so high that revenue was 
actually reduced, and they were matched ideally by excise taxes on domestically produced 
goods.  (5) Free trade was like abolitionism: it opposed legislation that forced some to trade their 
efforts to others for a lower relative price, or equivalently to buy goods for a higher relative 
price, than they would have done without the legislation. (6) Free trade militated against the 
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monopolistic market power that was granted de facto by protective tariffs.  It was the antidote to 
class legislation that distributed income from farmers to manufacturing monopolies, from the 
majority to a minority, from the poor to the rich. 
  Figure 1 was unthinkable because a fear of exploitation of the poor by the rich was not a 
characteristic of protectionist arguments in the United States of the late nineteenth century.   
Rather, the burden of the protectionist argument was to persuade the public that protective tariffs 
served the interests of American farmers and manufacturers, capitalists and workers, rich and 
poor alike.  In one way or another all of them were set against foreign nations and a few 
importers who were held to be their pawns.  The arguments relating to income class, distribution 
and power belonged to free traders.  Figure 1 makes sense only if it is not “free trade” by which 
the plutocrat eviscerates the common man, but tariff protection.   
  And that, in fact, is how the picture originally appeared in Puck in September, 1888. The 
game is up: what is wrong with the picture is that I have doctored it to name the wrong doctrine.  
Where I have written “free trade,” the artist wrote “tariff.” There was no backlash against 
globalization in the late nineteenth century U.S. tariff debate.  There was a backlash against 
protection—or perhaps a half-backlash.  Participants in it expressed the class concern that 
characterizes the present day variant, but not the aversion to markets. 
  I will not argue that the game’s solution is devastating to the lesson that we must attend 
to the perceived distributive inequities of globalization if globalization is not to be reversed.  To 
accept that there was no globalization backlash influencing U.S. trade policy is not to imply that 
there is no such backlash – still less that there should not be one.  Nor is it to imply that backlash 
cannot reverse globalization.  The lesson has one less leg to stand on, but it will stand anyway.  
There may be other historical support for it, even if not from nineteenth century American trade 
policy.  More importantly, most observers are probably less persuaded of the lesson by history 
than by more direct evidence of the growing resentment of globalization.  Whatever account is 
given of the prior era of globalization, it is hard to ignore the prevalence in the present of scenes 
like Figure 4, or the nearly three million votes and decisive influence in the last U.S. presidential 
election of the Green Party, whose platform opposed the NAFTA, the GATT, and the WTO 
(Green Party of the United States 2000, IV.F.1).  These phenomena, to name only two of myriad, 
have consequences. 
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  Another lesson emerges, though, that matters more.  The reason why it is surprising to 
learn that the United States witnessed a backlash against protection, perhaps, but not against 
globalization—the reason why Figure 1 as I have doctored it is more comprehensible at first 
sight than the original—is that the authors of the ideas that made the original possible are omitted 
from our histories.  One reason for the omission is that they lost the debate: losers are easily 
forgotten even if they mattered. A greater reason is that they have not suited the context in which 
the histories have been written.  The distinguished Harvard historian Oscar Handlin wrote an 
essay pertaining to our topic in 1943, in the context of an expanding state involved in wartime 
controls and soon to be involved in post-war reconstruction and international macroeconomic 
management.  Laissez faire could hardly be a guide to policy; Arthur Latham Perry warranted 
mention as an unworthy foil, but no more.  As Handlin viewed nineteenth century economic 
thought, he found that “ideas phrased in terms of laissez faire were so rare and so thoroughly 
divorced from reality and practice that they remained almost completely sterile” (1943, p. 65).  
Perry’s ideas in particular “were clearly exotic, without influence on the thought or action of the 
state” (ibid., p. 60).  If the reader is persuaded by the evidence that I have presented here of the 
salience of Perry’s ideas to the tariff question, then she will agree that Handlin’s view is 
indefensible.  Yet he defended it.  Given Perry’s eclipse in history, we may conclude that he 
defended it successfully.  How? 
  What we include or omit in history signals the ideas that capture our attention and will 
likely shape the policies to come.  “Globalization backlash” has a foothold in history, despite the 
evidence given here—while Arthur Latham Perry does not, despite the evidence given here— 
because of an idea.  The idea is that opposition to free trade is a stance favoring the powerful 
above the bereft of power, the moneyed over the dispossessed. 
  The lesson of history is that we must attend to that idea if globalization is not to be 
reversed.  In appearance, the lesson is not so different from O’Rourke and Williamson’s—but it 
is considerably different in emphasis and the agenda that it implies for further study.  With 
respect to globalization’s perceived distributive inequities, distribution has received the greater 
weight of attention, perception the lesser weight.  It is time to change the weights.  What are 
required are histories of ideas.  
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